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Abstract. Risk of Profit Loss Sharing Financing: The Case of Indonesia. 
This study analyzes the risk of profit-and-loss sharing finance in Indonesian 
Islamic banking. Data used is secondary data obtained from the Financial Services 
Authority’s 2009-2014 publication. Financing risk is measured by risk return 
and opportunity cost. Results of the study show that risk return in mudharaba 
financing is more volatile than that in musharaka as it is potentially driven by 
agency problems. In all groups of banks, higher incomes are more promising in 
mudharaba than musharaka; but individually musharaka is more attractive 
to Islamic Rural Bank groups, and vice versa for the Sharia Bank groups. The 
one side it is more secure for Islamic banking to allocate funds in musharaka 
contract, which is an alternative to murabaha. However, musharaka contract 
is less attractive due to lower potential returns. Although high returns are more 
promising in mudaraba, this financing mode has higher risk of returns.
Keywords: mudharaba; musharaka; murabaha; profit-loss sharing; risk averse 
Abstrak. Risiko Pembiayaan Profit Loss Sharing: Kasus Indonesia. 
Penelitian ini menganalisis risiko pembiayaan profit loss sharing perbankan Islam 
di Indonesia. Data yang digunakan merupakan data sekunder hasil publikasi 
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan periode 2009-2014. Risiko pembiayaan diukur dengan 
risiko pengembalian dan opportunity cost. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa 
risiko pengembalian pada pembiayaan mudharaba lebih berfluktuasi dibanding 
musharakah yang secara potensial didorong oleh agency problem. Untuk seluruh 
kelompok bank, mudharaba lebih menjanjikan pendapatan yang lebih tinggi 
dibanding musharaka; tetapi secara individual musharaka lebih menarik bagi 
kelompok Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah, dan sebaliknya bagi Bank Syariah. 
Pada satu sisi perbankan Islam lebih aman untuk mengalokasikan dananya pada 
kontrak musharaka sebagai alternatif murabaha, namun kontrak musharaka 
kurang menarik karena memiliki potensi pengembalian yang rendah. Sementara 
mudharaba menjanjikan pengembalian yang tinggi namun memiliki risiko 
pengembalian yang tinggi pula.
Kata kunci: mudharaba; musharaka; murabaha; profit-loss sharing; risk averse
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Introduction
Islamic banking refers to a system of banking that is consistent with the principles 
of Islamic law (Sharia). Sharia prohibits the interest charges (riba) for the lending and 
accepting of money. Islamic banking actually promotes the concept of profit and loss 
sharing. There are two types of Islamic bank operating in Indonesia presently: Sharia 
Bank (Sharia Commercial Bank and Sharia Business Unit) and Islamic Rural Bank. 
Sharia Commercial Bank (Bank Umum Syariah, BUS) is a Islamic bank providing 
services in the transaction of payments. Sharia Business Unit (Unit Usaha Syariah, UUS) 
is a work unit of a conventional commercial bank that conduct business activities based 
on Sharia principles. Islamic Rural Bank (Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah, BPRS) is 
Islamic bank which do not provide services in the transaction of payment.
Islamic banking still has a relatively low share in Indonesia banking industry, 
with only about 5 percent. However, there has been a significant growth over the last 
five years. In Data from the Financial Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 
OJK) indicates that in December 2014 the number of third party funds (dana pihak 
ketiga, DPK) customers rose to nearly 10 million new accounts in the Sharia Bank, 
and the number of DPK deposit accounts increased from 4.5 million in 2009 to 
14.4 million in 2014. Along with the increase in deposits, there was also an increase 
in the Sharia Bank financing, as indicated by 3.8 million funding requests that they 
serve, which is a huge number compared to 800 thousand financing requests that 
the finances were able to serve in 2009. Increased financing also occurs in BPRS, 
which in 2014 served twice the number of customers demanding financing in 2009.
Table 1. The Islamic Banking Network 
Indikator 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Sharia Commercial Bank (BUS)      
 -  Number of Bank 5  6 11 11 11 11 12
 -  Number of Office 581 711 1,215 1,401 1,745 1,998 2,151
Sharia Business Unit (UUS)       
 -  Number of Bank 27 25 23 24 24 23 22
 -  Number of Office 241 287 262 336 517 590 320
 Islamic Rural Bank (BPRS)       
 -  Number of Bank 131 138 150 155 158 163 163
 -  Number of Office 202 225 286 364 401 402 439
 Total Office 1,024 1,223 1,763 2,101 2,663 2,990 2,910 
Source: OJK (2015) 
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As can be seen on Table 1, the network of BUS and BPRS branches has also 
increased. The number of BUS was relatively stagnant from 2010 to 2013, where 
as the UUS experienced a declining trend. Similarly, the number of their offices has 
been declining sharply since 2012. 
Data obtained from the OJK (2015) show that over the last five years 
Islamic banking assets has grown by an average of 33 percent. BUS and UUS 
assets have increased almost five-fold since 2009; while BPRS assets multiplied 
by 3.4-fold. Asset grow this certainly sourced from either debt or capital and 
the creation of new sources of revenue for Islamic banking. However, from the 
aspect of financing allocation it appears to be less encouraging since the financing 
disbursed only relied on one type, namely murabaha, a mode of cost plus sales 
financing; while other modes of profit-and-loss sharing, namely mudharaba and 
musharaka, leases or ijara, and loan or qardh, only contributed insignificantly to 
the total finance. As for the Sharia Bank, the average proportion of murabaha 
financing in 2014 was nearly 60 percent, whereas for the BPRS it reached to more 
than 80 percent.
The tendency of financing allocation in the murabaha of Islamic banking 
is not without reason. The murabaha is a cost plus sales financing, where the 
purchaser (debtor) promise to purchase at a price which includes the cost of 
the purchase plus a pre-agreed profit. Thus, murabaha is risk-free. The other 
sides, profit and loss sharing (PLS) contract in Islamic banking is sourced from 
mudharaba and musharaka. The mudharaba is a profit-sharing agreement that 
fund owner (investor) provides capital to entrepreneurs (mudharib) on condition 
that profits generated will be divided among the parties according to specified 
agreement. In the event of a loss due to normal process of business, the losses 
was borne entirely by the capital owner. However, if a loss is due to the manager’s 
negligence and fraud, then the entrepreneurs is fully held responsible for the loss. 
The musharaka involves a partnership between two parties who both provide 
capital towards the financing of new or established projects. Both parties share 
the profits on a pre-agreed ratio, allowing managerial skills to be remunerated, 
with losses being shared on the basis of equity participation (El Massah and Al-
Sayed, 2013). 
The differences in the types of the financing (portfolio) imply a difference 
in risks. The fund managers will prefer a financing that promises low risks but high 
profit. They will take into account potential profit or desirable profit rate and the 
relative income levels of various types of financing. A comparison of the relative 
income levels in different types of financing termed as opportunity cost. Where as 
a comparison between the level of desirable profit and the level of real income is 
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called expected profit. Markowitz (1959) was studied a linkage between financing 
portfolio and risk in the context of expected utility theory. Studies on Islamic 
banking risks have been conducted by several researchers, but they generally focused 
on credit risk (Abusharbeh, 2014; Said, 2013; Misman, 2012; Arifin and Tafri, 
2014); liquidity risk (Said, 2013; Muhammad et al, 2011; Ahmed et al, 2011; Arifin 
and Tafri, 2014); operational risk (Said, 2013; Marliana, et al, 2011); management 
risk (Arifin, et al; 2009; Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei, 2007). There is a paucity in 
the study of financing risks in the context of expected utility, and opportunity cost 
between murabaha and PLS financing. 
This study is an attempt to examine the risk of profit loss sharing (PLS) 
financing in the context of expected utility in Indonesian Islamic banking. It attempts 
to reveal the natural risk musharaka and mudharaba financing; and between type of 
banks (Sharia and Islamic Rural Bank). This paper is justified on the following 
reasons. (1) It provides an important point for research involving the risk of PLS 
financing of Indonesian Islamic banking industry. (2) It is one of the first empirical 
studies that use opportunity cost (PLS financing against murabaha financing) to 
examine risks of Islamic banks in Indonesia. (3) The empirical results of this study 
could help Indonesian Financial Service Authority in providing solutions for the lack 
of participation in PLS financing. Relatively few Islamic banking literatures evolved 
study of risk in expected utility context which may make a strong contribution to 
the area of Islamic banking. Significantly, this research has a new contribution in 
filling the gap of previous literatures to manage risk taking behaviour of Islamic 
banking. 
The reminder of this article is organized as follows. The next section explores 
the literature of the study. The third section describes research methodology. The 
fourth section analyzes the data variables and the implications. Moreover, the final 
part concludes the research.
Literature Review 
The type of contract in Islamic banking can be categorized into contract 
for profit and non profit. Islamic banking recognizes the profit contract consits 
profit loss sharing and non profit loss sharing. The profit loss sharing contract 
refers to a type of financing that has uncertain returns such as mudharaba and 
musharaka, whereas non sharing contract is applicable to a type with more certain 
returns, such as cost plus sales and lease. Included in the cost plus sales contract 
are murabaha, salam and istishna, whereas lease mode includes ijara contract. The 
murabaha is a term of Islamic fiqh which means a specific form of trading when 
the seller said the acquisition cost of the goods and other charges incurred for 
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acquiring goods and margin of the desired (Ascarya, 2006). The mudharaba is 
a profit sharing contract, with one party providing 100 per cent of the fund to 
invest and the other party (the mudarib). The musharaka involves a partnership 
between two parties who both provide fund of new or established business. Both 
parties share the profits on a pre-agreed ratio, with losses being shared on the basis 
of equity participation. One or both parties can undertake management of the 
business.
Thus, naturally both mudharaba and musharaka financing are highly risky, 
causing banks’ inclination to avoid them, or to adopt a risk-averse attitude towards 
the financing, which inevitably result in financing concentrated in murabaha. 
Chapra (2007) expresses his views that the share of PLS modes is so far relatively 
small in the financing operations of Islamic banks, and that of sales-based modes is 
predominantly high. Chapra (2007) emphasizes that the socioeconomic benefits of 
the prohibition of interest may not be realized fully until the share of PLS modes 
rises substantially in total financing. Khan and Bhatti (2008) considers that the PLS 
system is the heart of Islamic financial intermediation 
Abid (2014) conclude two factors inflict the most significant effect on 
the lower level of application of musharaka by Islamic banks: (1) management’s 
monitoring and controlling technique causes effect on the application of musharaka 
at a greater scale because of the fact that they are not fully equipped to deal with the 
issues relating to musharaka based financing and (2) the risk aversion approach of 
top management has also affected the larger reliance on musharakah based financing 
by the Islamic banks. 
Islam views Business as something that has no ‘fixed’ income; therefore it is 
only natural that any business is vulnerable to risks. Risk is defined as the possibility 
of one or more components of bank portofolio to fail (Freixas and Rochet, 2008), 
and this includes the possibility of debtor’s failure to repay its obligations or in 
ability to completely return their debts (Ghozali, 2007). Credit risk can be classified 
into individual risk and portfolio risk (Saunders and Cornett, 2003). 
A research on portfolio risks and how to determine optimal risks was first 
conducted by Markowitz (1959). Risk is measured quantitatively by Markowitz and 
treated as a statistical measure called variance. A risk variance is a return distribution 
that measures the firmness of the return distribution around the average, or better 
known as the expected return (expected utility). Markowitz assumes that investors 
prefer larger return with lesser risks. Markowitz treats any portfolio as a single point 
(Beste et al, 2002). To avoid or minimize risks, investors diversify their investment 
strategies by creating a portfolio of several stocks that are considered efficient. Thus 
investors themselves are more likely to adopt a risk-averse behavior. In the context 
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of their behavior towards the risk it self, three types of behavior are possible: (1) 
risk-averse, giving a choice between two assets with equal rates of return, an investor 
will select the asset with lower level of risk; (2) risk-lover (seeking), giving a choice 
between two assets with equal rates of return, an investor will select the asset with 
higher level of risk; and (3) risk neutral, giving a choice between two assets with 
equal rates of return, the investor is indifferent to select any of them (Reilly and 
Brown, 2012).
Islamic bank transactions are more suitable for risk-lover or aggressive 
depositors, but on the contrary, it is more suitable for risk-averse or conservative 
borrowers, because PLS helps the borrower to share risk with Islamic Bank, for 
example musharaka (El Massah and Al-Sayed, 2013). Abid (2014) revealed the 
various factors influencing the application of musharaka financing by Islamic 
banks in three major categories: (1) internal factors; include: management’s 
monitoring and controlling techniques; the role of top management, and effect of 
shariah supervision; (2) external factors: customers’ preferences, dan government 
policies; and (3) communal factors: moral hazard, operational difficulties, and 
high risk. 
A risk-averse attitude of fund owners can also be seen from their choice of a 
contract, where a revenue-sharing contact is more preferable than a profit-and-loss 
sharing contract, since the revenue-sharing type can reduce financial risks, although 
it still has an equal rate of return as the value of gross receipts is always greater or 
at least break even, while the value of receipts minus production cost will result in 
profit or loss. This means that in the revenue-sharing type, fund owners will never 
lose (at least for the revenue-sharing = 0 yet the capital remains intact), whereas in 
the profit-and-loss sharing type, fund owners may suffer losses to the extent of the 
amount of their capital (Ascarya: 2006).
Methods 
This study analyzes secondary data obtained from the monthly publication 
of the Indonesian Financial Services Authority in 2009-2014 period. The analysis 
is focused on the assessment of potential risks which consists: risk of return and 
risk of income losses as a result of participating in a particular type of financing 
(opportunity cost). The risk of return under uncertainty is measured by expected 
utility and variance of profit. This study use equivalent rate of return as proxy rate 
profit variable, thus risk of return is estimated by the standard deviation of equivalent 
of PLS return. A high standard deviation means that the profit is volatile (uncertain) 
or high risk, while a low standard deviation means a profit is generally consistent in 
producing similar returns or low risk. 
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where: S = risk of return of PLS financing 
 xi = each value of equivalent rate of return of PLS financing
  = mean of equivalent rate of return of PLS financing
 n  = the total number of data points
The risk of opportunity cost (OC) in Islamic bankingis the average ratio of 
the equivalent rate of return of PLS against murabaha financing, or:
where:  OCpls = opportunity cost of PLS financing 
  x   = equivalent rate of return 
 pls  = mudharaba, musharaka financing
 m  = murabaha financing
 OC > 1 means that it is more attractive to invest in the PLS financing
On theother hand, risk-taking behavior is one that is adopted by Islamic 
banking to avoid a financing that has uncertain returns (PLS financing). The higher 
of proportion of PLS financing, the higher of willingness to share risk. Risk taking 
behavior estimated by: 
RT > 1 risk lover; 
RT ≤ 1 risk averse 
where: RT = Risk-taking relative 
 s = share of financing
 pls  = mudharaba, musharaka financing
 m = murabaha financing
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Results and Discussion 
The Financing Development of Islamic Banking 
The types of financing currently offered in Sharia Bank (SB) are mudharaba, 
musharaka, murabaha, istishna, ijara and qardh. In addition to these, BPRS also 
provides salam and multi-services contracts. The composition of financing services 
provided by SB over the period of 2009-2014 is presented in Table 2. In general, 
there was a tendency for the amount of financing to increase, except for qardh 
which has decreased since 2012. Up to 2014, the total value of qardh financing was 
5.9 billion. The biggest financing on SB was murabaha which has increased more 
than five times since 2009. The average proportion of murabaha contracts over the 
last six years was 58 percent; on the next place was musharaka contracts, about 22 
percent; and the third one was mudharaba, reaching only 9 percent. The dominance 
of murabaha finance was also apparent in BPRS as can be seen in Figure 1, with a 
proportion of 80 percent. In contrast to these, the total amount of ijara, istishna, 
and salam contracts is below 1 percent.
 Table 2. The Composition of Financing of Sharia Bank (billions of rupiah) 
Contract 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mudharaba 6,597 8,631 10,229 12,023 13,625 14,354
Musharaka 10,412 14,624 18,960 27,667 39,874 49,387
Murabaha 26,321 37,508 56,365 88,004 110,565 117,371
Istishna 423 347 326 376 582 633
Ijara 1,305 2,341 3,839 7,345 10,481 11,620
Qardh 1,829 4,731 12,937 12,090 8,995 5,965
 Total  46,886  68,181  102,655  147,505 184,122 199,330
Source: OJK (2015) 
On the other hand, based on the types of use, banking financial allocation can 
be categorized into productive (working capital and investment) and consumptive 
financing. A statistical data about Islamic banking in December 2014 period reveals 
that allocation for productive financing was about 60 percent, and the remaining 
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percentage went to consumptive financing. This financing variation would surely 
affect the variation of existing non-performing financing (NPF) because working 
capital, investment, and consumption financing pose different risks. The percentage 
of NPF occurred in Islamic banking financing in 2014 are as follows: 6.24 on 
working capital, 4.45 on investment, and 2.6 on consumer. The data indicates 
that consumer financing has a rate of refund that is smoother and less risky than 
the othert ypes, and as a result consumer financing has a sufficiently high share in 
Islamic banking.
Furthermore, although financing allocation is used for productive, PLS is not 
the only contract offered, since other contracts, such as murabaha are also available. 
As of December 2014, the proportion of productive financing which used PLS 
contract on SB was 53.27 percent, while on BPRS it was only 21.29 percent. That 
PLS contract has an insignificant role in productive financing is a further indication 
of Islamic banking’s reluctance to share risks.
(a) Financing Proportion of Sharia Bank
Source: OJK (2015) processed 
(b) Financing Proportion of Islamic Rural Bank 
Figure 1. The proportion of Financing in Islamic Banking 2009-2014 
The Islamic Banking in Indonesia more risk averse, as shows average value 
risk taking lower than one (or 0.35) as presented in Table 3. That means, proportion 
of PLS financing is 35 percent of murabaha financing. The risk averse behavior is 
more restrained in the SB groups than BPRS, as indicated by the risk averse average 
of the SB, which reached 0.55, while BPRS reached 0.16. Thus, BPRS is highly 
risk-averse in financing allocation. In fact, the BPRS group is extremely rigid in 
allocating funds to PLS contract, as was indicated by the small standard of deviation 
which was 0.01. Figure 2 provide a comparative development of risk-averse of 
Islamic Banking in Indonesia within the period 2009-2014.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics Risk Taking Behaviour of Islamic  
Banking in Indonesia
Description Sharia Bank
(SB)
Islamic Rural Bank 
(BPRS)
Total of Bank
Maximum 0.66 0.18 0.66
Minimum 0.44 0.14 0.14
Average 0.55 0.16 0.35
Standard Deviation 0.07 0.01 0.20
Source: Result of Research
A relatively high spike of risk-averse behavior was experienced by SB group 
up to 2012. In the beginning of 2013, this risk-averse tendency seemed to decrease 
both in the groups of BPRS and SB. At the end of 2014, the proportion of PLS 
against murabaha financing of BPRS was still low or about 17 percent, while that 
of the SB was 54 percent. The downward trend in the risk aversion is expected to 
continue in the SB group, which controls more than 90 percent of Islamic banking 
financing in Indonesia. The risk aversion of BPRS group is also expected to continue 
to decline, given that BPRS is a financial institution that closer to small medium 
enterprise’s (SME’s). In fact, the financial share of SME’s in BPRS reaches 60 percent 
of the total financing distributed.
Source: OJK (2015) Processed
Figure 2. Risk Averse Behavior of Indonesian Islamic Banking 2009-2014 
Table 4 presents risk of return of PLS financing. Based on the type of financing 
in total, the risk of return of mudharaba is higher than musharaka, as indicated by 
the standard of deviation 5.34 percent; while musharaka was 4.14 percent. In terms 
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of individual bank, there are different levels of risk. On the SB groups, the risk of 
return of mudharaba is higher than musharaka, but opposite to BPRS. 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics Risk of Return of Profit Loss  
Sharing Financing (percent)
Description Sharia Bank (SB) Islamic Rural Bank 
(BPRS)
Total
Mudharaba Musharaka Mudharaba Musharaka Mudharaba Musharaka
Maximum 77.09 14.97 23.52 23.79 77.09 23.79
Minimum 14.14 10.85 14.73 14.18 14.13 10.85
Average 18.03 12.82 18.47 20.04 18.25 16.43
Stand. 
Deviation
7.33 1.22 2.01 2.56 5.34 4.14
Source: Results of the research 
Furthermore, other financing risk associated with Islamic banking is 
opportunity cost (OC). A descriptive statistics of the opportunity costs is given in 
Table 5. OC average of mudharaba contract to all group bank show the value more 
than one (or >1); and lower than one (or <1) to musharaka contract. However 
on an individual basis, this is only consistent on SB group. This shows that in SB 
groups, the opportunity to earn a higher income is more probable in mudharaba 
than musharaka contract. The opposite applies to BPRS. Thus, when viewed from 
the income aspect, mudharaba is the next most appealing financing after murabaha 
in SB, whereas musharaka takes this position in BPRS.
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics Opportunity Cost of PLS Financing (percent)
Description Sharia Bank (SB) Islamic Rural Bank 
(BPRS)
Total 
Mudharaba Musharaka Mudharaba Musharaka Mudharaba Musharaka
Maximum 1.51 1.11 1.23 1.24 1.51 1.24
Minimum 0.22 0.14 0.71 0.73 0.22 0.14
Average 1.14 0.86 0.96 1.04 1.05 0.94
Standard 
Deviation
0.19 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.19
Source: Results of the Research 
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There is obviously a difference in the risk taking behaviors adopted by SB 
and BPRS. While SB s are more flexible about facing risk, BPRS is more rigid or 
more reluctant to share risks due to lower ability to control the financing risk. Most 
BPRS have high efficiency but not have high profitability, vice versa (Warninda and 
Hosen, 2015). BPRS being powerless against mudharib and other business partners 
that belongs mostly small medium enterprises (SME’s). The SME’s group is also 
one of the constraints of the implementation of PLS contract (Ahmed, 2006; Iqbal 
and Llewellyn, 2002). The most important aspect (priority) performance of sharia 
microfinance among the clusters is human resources (Amalia and Atiqah, 2015).
The risk of return mudharaba in general much more volatile than musharaka. 
This is largely due to the fact, in mudharaba fund granted is managed by the 
mudharib itself. The only obligation of the mudharib is to report any revenue. 
Its potentially causing mudharaba to be highly vulnerable to agency problems 
(Chong &Liu, 2009). Agency problems occur when an entrepreneur has an 
incentive to report lower revenues. Initially, this issue arises due to asymmetric 
information on mudharib, which causes the Islamic Banking to experience adverse 
selection (Shinsuke, 2010; Safieddine, 2009). It is then obvious that business ethics 
is another potential issue related to PLS financing in Islamic Banking (Farooq 
&Ahmed, 2013).
Furthermore, empirical findings show that, for the entire groups of banks, 
the value of the opportunity cost (OC) of mudharaba is bigger than one (or > 1), 
and musharaka is lower than one (or <1). However, for individual bank, the OC 
of mudharaba is < 1, while musharaka is >1 in the BPRS group. This suggests that, 
in terms of potential revenue in BPRS, musharaka contract is more attractive than 
mudharaba, and the opposite occurs in the SB group.
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that on the one hand Islamic 
banking considers it more secure to allocation funds to murabaha contract, which 
is an alternative to musharaka. However, musharaka contract is less attractive due 
to the low potential revenue that can be gained. While mudharaba offers more 
promising high returns, it is also accompanied by high risk of return. Therefore, 
among the reasons why banks are reluctant to apply for mudaraba are the high 
risk and the prudential reason. One of factors causing high risk in mudharaba is 
asymetric information, which in turn may tempt mudharib into moral hazard. 
Having said that, it must be recognized that the risk itself is natural in business. 
However, when a risk involves moral hazard, then a systemic steps is needed to 
minimize such behaviors. Since it encourages unfair profit loss sharing, moral 
hazard is seen as one form of business injustice. As a result, Islamic Banking more 
disincentives to develop mudharaba contract.
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There are actually several steps that can be taken to deal with the issue 
of moral hazard, for example apply a standard financial records to mudharib. 
However, such recording needs to be examined by an independent party. 
Although mudharib is not required to keep a financial statements (since it is only 
a small business group), it remains important to evaluate mudharib’s financial 
performance.
Therefore, to protect all parties that have agreed in a partnership, it is 
importance to clear rules as well as a mechanism of checks and balances. This 
mechanism can also be applied to the case of musharaka. Although it is recognized in 
musharaka that banks can be involved in business management or in the intervention 
of partner’s business according to particular agreement, some standard guide lines 
concerning financial records are needed, particularly those which recognize expenses 
and income, in order to reach a shared understanding between both parties of 
similar vein. It is also necessary to make every effort to improve banking managerial 
capabilities of mudharib and its business partners.
Conclusion 
Islamic banking generally adopts risk averse behaviors in allocating PLS 
financing, but Islamic Rural Bank group is apparently more risk averse than 
Sharia Bank. In general, the risk of return of mudharaba is more volatile than 
the risk of return of musharaka, due to the high potential of agency problems 
in mudharaba. The results of this study further reveal that among all groups 
of banks, murabaha promises higher incomes than musharaka. Individually, 
however mudaraba is more attractive to the groups of Sharia Banks, except for 
Islamic Rural Bank which considers musharaka to be more promising in gaining 
higher returns and therefore find it more attractive. Islamic banking considers it 
more secure to allocation of financing to mushakara contract, as an alternative 
to murabaha contract, although its less attractive due to the low potential 
revenue that can be obtained. However, while mudharaba is more promising 
in terms of high returns, it is also accompanied by high risk of return. Several 
steps can be taken to minimize the risk averse behaviors of Islamic banks: first, 
developing a standard of financial records under management of an independent 
agency; second, introducing a regulation that serves as a mechanism of checks 
and balances; third, increasing banking managerial abilities of mudharib/business 
partners over business conditions. 
114
http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/iqtishad
DOI: 10.15408/aiq.v8i1.2511
Al-Iqtishad: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Syariah (Journal of Islamic Economics) 
Vol. 8 (1), January 2016
References 
Abid, M.M. (2014). Critical Analysis of Some of The Major Internal Hindrance Factors 
in The Application of Musharakah Financing by the Islamic Banks. International 
Journal of Education and Research Vol. 2 No. 9, pp 125-142
Abusharbeh, M.T. (2014). Credit Risks and Profitability of Islamic Banks: 
Evidence from Indonesia. World Review of Business Research Vol. 4. No. 
3. pp. 136 – 147 
Ahmed, M. (2006). Practice of Mudharaba and Musharaka in Islamic Banking. 
Journal of Islamic Economics and Finance Vol. 2 No.1. 
Ahmed, A. & Naqvi. (2011). Liquidity Risk and Islamic Banks: Evidence from 
Pakistan. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research in Business Vol. 1, Issue. 9. 
pp.99- 102
Amalia, Euis & Atiqah, M. (2015). Evaluating The Models of Sharia Microfinance in 
Indonesia: An Analytical Network Process (ANP) Approach. Al-Iqtishad: Vol. 7, 
No. 1. pp.13-30
Ariffin, A.F. & Tafri, F.H. (2014). The Impact of Financial Risk on Islamic Banks’ 
Profitability. International Conference on Business, Sociology and Applied 
Sciences (ICBSAS’14) March 26-27, 2014 in Kuala Lumpur 
Ariffin, N, et.al. (2009). Risks in Islamic Banks: Evidence From Empirical Research. 
Journal of Banking Regulation, 10(2), pp 153-163.
Ascarya. (2006). Contract and Product of Islamic Banking: Concepts and Practices 
Some State. Jakarta: Bank Indonesia. 
Al-Tamimi, H. & Al-Mazrooei, F. (2007). Banks’ Risk Management: A Comparison 
Study of UAE National and Foreign Banks. The Journal of Risk Finance, Vol. 
8 No. 4. pp. 394-409. 
Beste, et al, (2002). The Markowitz Model: Selecting an Efficient Investment Portfolio. 
Lafayette College, Mathematics REU Program.
Chapra, M.U. (2007). The Case Against Interest: Is It Compelling?, Thunderbird 
International Business Review Vol. 49 (2). pp.161-186.
Chong, B.S. & Liu, M.H. (2009). Islamic Banking: Interest-Free or Interest-Based. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 17, 125–144.
El Massah, S. & Al-Sayed, O. (2013). Risk Aversion and Islamic Finance: An 
Experimental Approach. International Journal of Information Technology and 
Business Management. Vol.16 No.1 , pp. 49-77
Ernawati: Risk of Profit Loss Sharing Financing  115
http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/iqtishad
DOI: 10.15408/aiq.v8i1.2511
Farooq, M. & Ahmed, M.M.M. (2013). Musharaka Financing: Experience of 
Pakistani Banks. World Applied Sciences Journal 21 (2), pp. 181-189.
Freixas. X & Rochet J.C. (2008). Microeconomics of Banking. Maschacutes: MIT 
Press.
Ghozali, I. (2007). Banking Risk Management: Value at Risk approach. Semarang: 
Badan Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro. 
Iqbal, M. & Llewellyn, D. (2002). Islamic Banking and Finance: New Perspectives on 
Profit-Sharing and Risk. USA: Edward Elgar Northampton 
Jacobs, B.I, et.al. (2005). Portofolio Optimization with Factors, Scenarios, and Realistic 
Short Positions. Operation Research Vol 53 No. 4, pp. 586-599
Khan, M.M. & Bhatti, M.I. (2008). Development in Islamic Banking: The case of 
Pakistan. England: Palgrave Macmillan
Marliana A, et.al. (2011). Operational Risk in Islamic Banks: Examination of Issues. 
Qualitative Research in Financial Markets, 3 (2), pp. 131–151.
Misman, F.N. (2012). Financing Structures, Bank Specific Variables and Credit Risk: 
Malaysian Islamic Banks. Journal of Business and Policy Research Vol. 7. No. 
1. April 2012 Special Issue. pp. 102 - 114 
Muhammad F, et.al. (2011). Liquidity Risk Management: A comparative Study 
Between Conventional and Islamic Banks of Pakistan. Interdisciplinary Journal 
of Research in Business, 1, 35-44.
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. (2015). Islamic Banking Statistics December 2014, Jakarta: 
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan RI. 
Pratama, Y.C. (2015). Macroeconomic Variable and Its Influence on Performance of 
Indonesian Islamic Banking. Al-Iqtishad: Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 45-58.
Reilly, F. & Brown, K. (2012). Analysis of Investment and Management of Portfolio. 
Canada: South-Western 
Said, A. (2013). Risks and Efficiency in the Islamic Banking Systems: The Case of 
Selected Islamic Banks in MENA Region. International Journal of Economics 
and Financial Issues Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.66-73
Saunders, A. & Cornett, M.M. (2003). Financial Institutions Management: A Risk 
Management Approach. Singapore: Mc Graw Hill.
Shinsuke, Nagaoka. (2010). Reconsidering Mudarabah Contracts in Islamic Finance: 
What is the Economic Wisdom (Hikmah) of Partnership-based Instruments?. 
Review of Islamic Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 65–79.
116
http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/iqtishad
DOI: 10.15408/aiq.v8i1.2511
Al-Iqtishad: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Syariah (Journal of Islamic Economics) 
Vol. 8 (1), January 2016
Warninda, T.D. & Hosen, M.N. (2015). Mapping and Correlation Analysis of 
Efficiency and Profitability: The Case of Islamic Rural Bank in Indonesia. Al-
Iqtishad: Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 1-12
